Abrrmct-This paper presents a novel secure, anonymous and prartical payment protocol for Peer-to-Peer commerce transactions', designed 10 enable every user to both buy and sell items. The protocol uses electronic cash for payment transactions. This new protocol provides amsumen with full anonymity since it prevents the user from proriding hisrher credit card numberand personaldata. Itissuitableformiem-pay~"ts(under1 Euro) BS well PI maem-payments using cutting edge technologies in security algor i t h m S .
I. INTRODUCTION
HE growth of the Internet in the last years has created an T .
electronic marketplace for goods and service!;. With the turn of the century over 70 million computers are connected to the Internet [2] . Successful e-business sites like Amazon.com [I] or ebay [3] have recognized the business potential of this huge number of users and offer world-wide services to consumers for buying and selling goods using,their web browsers.
Additionally. technological innovations on micr,>processors and storage devices have furnished regular PCs. stand alone workstations with enormous computing power and storage capacity. These computers usually offer more capabilities than needed, resulting in sub par utilization. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) computing, a term coined after the strong and delivering contents scheme using peer users' computers, is increasingly receiving attention as a new distributed computing paradigm for its potential to harness 'edge' computers, such as PCs and handheld devices, and make their underutilized resources available to each other. The exact definition of term 'PZP'. varies widely depending on the context it is used in. Some define P2P as a class of applications operating in an environment of unstabla connectivity [6] . Others view pure P2P applications without centralized servers [7] . (A simple example of such a kind of implementation comes from the IEEE 802.1 Ib's ad-hoc [81 working group mode. In this mode, computers join a wireless network as peers, and every computer in the network can communicate directly with the other computers connected to the same network avoiding centralized communication through a server). Most existing P2P platforms, whether intended or not, are desi::ned exclusively for sharing one or two types of resources [91, [IO] . Secution, Integrity, Non-repudiation and Monitoring.
There are a number of proposed solutions for electronic cash systems. All of them lack flexibility in anonymity. David Chaum et al. [5] first proposed an on-line payment system that would guarantee receiving valid coins. This system provides some levels of anonymity against a collaboration of shops and banks. However, users have no flexible anonymity and banks have to keep a very big database for users and coins. Another on-line CyberCoin (http://www.cybercash.com) approach allows clients to make payments by signing fund transfer requests to merchants. The merchants submit the signed requests to the bank for authorization of the payments. However, the scalability of the CyberCoin protocol is questionable since it relies on the availability of a single on-line bank. NetBill [I I] extends the above payment mechanism by supporting goods atornicily and certified delivery. The most sophisticated protocol is the SET protocol [12] , which was designed to facilitate credit card transactions over the Internet. SET security comes at a considerable computation and communication cost. SET, unlike other simpler on-line protocols, does not offer full anonymity, non-repudiation or certified delivery and it is not appropriate for micro-payments.
Combining the P2P characteristics with the e-commerce, some companies are promoting new services via this new infrastructure (Trymedia Systems, Lightshare. PinPost, CenterSpan, First peer). All these companies claim that support P2P commerce, but they actually use e-mails or SSL (Secure Socket Layer) for the purchase transaction. Our solution takes existing P2P commerce a step bzyond. In fact, it is the first real P2P payment system. In this paper a new electronic-payment model is presented.
It takes advantage of P2P networks and it provides a complete anonymous, secure and practical framework in which each peer can act both as a merchant and a customer. This novel protocol can prevent from eavesdropping, tampering, impersonation and double spending. rity issues in such systems are not as critical as for enterprizes and especially for those which deal with e-commerce. In those systems the desired security features are: Privacy, .4uthentica-The paper is organized as follows. the following section basic definition!; regarding the protocol and the se. 
DEFINITIONS

A . Protocol definitions
The following terms are used for the description of the protocol: PANSecret: is the combination of 2 secrets: The secret of the broker and the secret of the Peer CustomerlPeer Vendor. Both the broker and the customerlvendor have this combination. These secrets are given in the bank, when the customerlvendor requests to use his account for electronic transactions. PAN: is the bank account number. I D : identifies uniquely the Peer CustomerNendor and can certify his identity. The ID is the digest:
Hash(PANSecret/Hash(PANSecret)/PAN) PeerID: A unique identifier for each peer (user).
Brokerscrip: is the digital coin, produced by the broker(bank). 
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V, =The vendor sends to the customer the VendorScrip's
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I . Scrip Security
This kind of security prevents the user from double spending the scrip, tampering the scrip and it is also used for proving ownership of the scrip.
Each time a scrip is produced (by a vendor or a broker), it is encrypted and stored locally. Each time a transaction takes place, the stored scrip is compared with the received one. Every Scrip has a unique Scrip Identification Number (ScripID). A vendor or a broker is able to validate a scrip by using existing Look Up Tables, which bind the unique ScripID with a MasterSicripSecret (figure 2). The Masterscripsecret is used for the creation of a unique certificate for each Scrip. The certificate is an inseparable pan of the scrip and it is used for the validation of the scrip.
Finally, the ownership of the scrip is proved by the CustomerSecret (figure 3) which is produced the same time with a scrip and, therefore, it is unique for each scrip holder. It is sent along with the scrip. Additionally, the ScripBdy contains the field ProducerlD, which uniquely identifies the producer (vendor or broker).
Message Security
This kind of security ensures confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and non-repudiation, Each time a message is sent, initially it is symmetrical encrypted by a random generated key using the AES (Rijndael) algorithm [13] with 192 bits key. Besides the AES algorithm the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) [ 131 mode is used to change the behavior of the cipher so that the same plaintext block no longer necessarily encrypts to the same ciphertext block. Further. the random generated key is asymmetrical encrypted using the well-known RSA [I31 algorithm with 1024 hits key. This procedure (called -session-key encryption) reduces the time for encryption (asymmetric encryption is slow, as much as 1000 times slower than symmetric) and ensures private and public keys' resistance to cryptanalysis. The authentication and the data integrity are ensured by the use of digital signatures, using the SHA-I algorithm [I31 for hashing and the RSA algorithm for encryption. Data integrity is achieved by checking the signature against the data to determine that the data hasn't been change since it was signed. One disadvantage of a message digest [13] is the possibility of someone tampering with both the data and the message digest. By signing the digest with a private key (digital signature) it is impossible for an attacker to recreate the signature with a new sct of data unless the attacker has access to the signer's private key. As mentioned-above digital signatures, also, establish the identity of the signer (authentication). As only the pos:;essor of a private key can sign a piece of data, it can be ensured that as long as that key hasn't been compromised. that user did indeed sign it. This. also, provides with a means of non-repudiation, 3. Account Security When a customerherchant deals with a bank, helshe has to provide hisher ID (Hash(PANSecret(Hash(PANSecret#'AN) in order to prove ownership of the bank account. Each t h e the hroker receives an ID, recalculates the ID from the st0re.d data and compares it with the received one.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a novel, secure and anonymous protocol, since no credit card is used and only the broker has access to peer's private information. This protocol is used i n a decentralized Peer-to-Peer network taking into account all the necessary security measures for providing secure transactions within this unsecured framework. It can be used for micro-payments as well as for medium and macro-payments. The presented epayment protocol is the only one which can be thought as 'pure' P2P.
